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ALD-165
 
       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4551 
___________ 
 
ALFRED PETROSSIAN, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
JERRY S. COLLINS; 
ROSE MARY HOWELL; 
SUSAN A. COLE, in their individual and official capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-04882) 
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 26, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, 
(Opinion filed: May 8, 2012) 
Circuit Judges 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Alfred Petrossian appeals, pro se, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 
complaint and amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).  Because we 
conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 
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3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
I. 
In August 2011, Petrossian filed a complaint in the District Court; the District 
Court allowed him to file an amended complaint in October 2011.  The defendants are all 
employees of Montclair State University (“MSU”), a public university in New Jersey.  
Petrossian, who is neither a student nor employed by MSU, spends time at the school 
library.1
On December 7, 2011, the District Court dismissed the complaint and the 
amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a non-
  In June 2011, Petrossian received a letter written by defendant Collins, stating 
that he would no longer be permitted on the MSU campus.  MSU’s decision was based 
on Petrossian’s “alleged policy violations” and disruptive conduct.  Petrossian claims that 
the ban is retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights.  He explains that he 
passed a note to the office of the MSU library dean complaining about a reference 
librarian.  In it, Petrossian described the librarian’s physical appearance and voice with 
insulting language.  He claims institutional racial discrimination, retaliation, “retributive 
justice,” and raises claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, and the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment.   
                                              
1 Petrossian states that, in 2008, he “joined a paid membership” at an MSU recreational 
center.  He asserts that the “membership was under the banner of ‘Alumni Association,’ a 
status which the plaintiff has held since mid-1970s . . . an association through which the 
plaintiff was officially given an ‘alumni Association’ status.”  He does not state 
affirmatively, however, that he actually is an MSU alumnus.  He further states that MSU 
terminated his membership in 2009. 
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frivolous claim against the defendants.  Petrossian filed a timely notice of appeal and a 
motion to reinstate the case.2
II. 
  The District Court denied that motion on January 13, 2012.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We review denials of Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of 
discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White
III. 
, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Summary action is warranted if an appeal presents no substantial question.  3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
As the District Court noted, to state a claim for relief under Title VII, Petrossian 
must at the very least allege that he was an MSU employee and that he suffered some 
employment discrimination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  He has done neither.  The District 
Court also correctly found that Petrossian failed to allege any violations of the rights 
protected by § 1981, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race in the making of 
public and private contracts.  See St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji
As to Petrossian’s § 1983 claim based on an alleged First Amendment violation, 
he has failed to establish that his note to the librarian was constitutionally protected 
, 481 U.S. 604, 609 
(1987). 
                                              
2  The District Court construed the motion as a motion to vacate or amend the prior 
order, given that Petrossian requested relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
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activity.  See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003).  His Sixth 
Amendment claim is meritless because the Sixth Amendment applies to criminal 
proceedings only.  See Turner v. Rogers
Lastly, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Petrossian’s § 1985 
claim.  To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege:  (1) a conspiracy of two 
or more persons; (2) motivated by racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed 
to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of person to the equal protection of 
the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or 
property or to the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.  
, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).  His Fourteenth 
Amendment claim—that he has a protected liberty interest in access to the MSU 
library—is conclusory and without any legal support.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
District Court that Petrossian failed to allege any violations of any protected rights, and 
thus, his claim under § 1983 is without merit.   
See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc.
Following the dismissal, Petrossian sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1), which 
provides that a court may relieve a party from final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect.”  He claimed that the District Court “took no interest in 
ascertaining how a U.S. Citizen . . . is permanently outcast from a public community and 
public venues, by mere false allegation of undefined ‘disruptive conducts.’”  The District 
, 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001).  He fails to allege any 
facts indicating that the defendants conspired to deprive him of protected rights or that 
their decision to deny him access to the MSU campus was racially motivated.  
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Court properly determined that Petrossian was attempting to relitigate his claims, and 
failed to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances warranting 60(b) relief.  See 
Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1977).  
Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1).  See Budget Blinds
IV. 
, 536 F.3d at 251. 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.  See
 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Petrossian’s 
motion for injunctive relief asking us to restore his access to MSU is denied. 
 
